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A Curious Case of  Cooperation and Coexistence: 
Church–State Engagement and Oppositional Free Spaces 
in Communist Yugoslavia and East Germany
The communist parties of  Eastern Europe sought to organize power relations to 
preclude potential opposition. While successful in aligning society, the economy, culture, 
education and politics in party institutions, East Germany and Yugoslavia approached 
the execution of  religious policy from a contrasting perspective. Unable to marginalize 
religion completely, the party and national churches entered into a vibrant, incentives-
based back-and-forth. Over time, Church–state accommodation crystallized, producing 
Church-based free spaces located outside of  the standard communist power structure. 
However, the ways in which East Germany and Yugoslavia engaged their churches 
generated different forms of  Church-based free space, which, by the late 1980s, 
produced variegated forms of  anti-communist opposition. 
Keywords: Eastern Europe, Civil Society, Church, Communism, Religious Policy, 
Nationalism, Oppositional Movements
Introduction
Government policy affects the spaces in which social actors work, designates and 
delineates boundaries and creates distinguishable spheres in which stakeholders 
act. While laws and legislation demonstrate where the lines of  acceptable 
political behavior lie, often they are subject to negotiation, mutual agreements 
or contentious dispute. These back-and-forth exchanges produce policies that 
rarely remain static. Over time, fl uid, dynamic relationships evolve between key 
stakeholders and elites, which further modify the policy’s trajectory, opening 
doors for new interpretations and new modes of  acting. 
Even in communist East Germany (GDR) and Yugoslavia, where authority 
was concentrated in single-party authoritarianism, power relations were neither 
a one-way street, nor were they monopolistic. There was one policy arena, 
in which one fi nds an illustrative example of  fl uid two-way, agent-to-agent 
engagement and cooperation: the arena of  Church–state relations. Despite 
times of  marginalization and suppression, it was the only policy arena that 
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necessitated negotiation and active quid pro quo.1 This study claims that decision-
making processes in East German and Yugoslav Church-state relations led to 
variegated forms of  Church-based oppositional free spaces, in which people were 
able to plant the seeds of  opposition to the legitimacy of  communist rule.2 In 
this essay, I claim that if  religious policy allows Churches to infl uence social 
issues, it is more likely that free spaces will emerge in which principles of  non-
violence, peaceful resolution and human rights prevail, and these spaces may 
play active roles in mediation in times of  unrest. If, however, religious policy 
excludes the Church on issues of  social policy, this will lead to the emergence 
of  free spaces, the actors of  which will be less loyal and less invested as social 
stakeholders. Since its intermediary role is thwarted, the Church will be less 
interested in liberal-democratic reform and will make fewer demands based on 
non-violence, inclusion and peace.
Religion policy and Church–state engagement under a communist regime 
was highly unique. The GDR and Yugoslav communist regimes devoted 
tremendous human and fi nancial resources to the regulation of  religious life, 
entrusting the various tasks to state secretariats, commissions for religious affairs, 
and security agencies. Despite their monopoly on authority, these regimes were 
never monolithic and, in turn, Churches were never passive victims. Rather, 
there arose a pragmatic exchange and vibrant Church-state dialogue based on 
negotiated responses to incentives: the state needed the Church for popular 
legitimacy, the consolidation of  power and international credibility, while the 
Church was dependent on the state for material goods, social services and sheer 
survival. Neither could function properly without the other, so a symbiotic 
necessity emerged, marked by micro-level discussions, communiqués, backroom 
deals and public deliberations. This fl uid quality was the fundamental mechanism 
that linked a set of  conditions to the outcome of  free spaces.3
1  Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 172.
2  Free spaces are an integral pillar for oppositional groups working in authoritarian societies, without 
which the chances of  success in challenging, reforming or toppling illiberal regimes may be signifi cantly 
lessened. The ability to organize, cultivate and articulate critical expression, free of  governmental 
intervention or violent crackdown, are the very heart of  what makes oppositional movements successful. 
While they may not be necessary for every movement and while each authoritarian regime may deal with its 
undesired, unsanctioned oppositional agents in different ways, the growing number of  successful regime-
critical groups which have demonstrated or currently demonstrate the usage of  similar forms of  free space, 
from Africa to Latin America, North America to Arab states, can no longer be ignored by social scientists.
3  Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, “Taking Process Tracing Seriously – The ‘Mechanismic’ 
Understanding and Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” paper presented at the Southern Political Science 
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5–8, 2011.
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Categorizing Conditions of  Church–State Engagement
The fi rst set of  conditions accounts for the initial types of  religious policy 
from 1945 to the early 1950s. The end of  the Second World War constituted a 
clear historical break from the recent past and a new political existence for the 
GDR and Yugoslavia. Each state approached its Churches in unique ways, while 
trying to solidify the supremacy of  the Communist Party. In the Soviet Zone 
of  Occupation (hereafter, SBZ) that would become East Germany, German 
communists needed to have a steady hand in navigating the chaotic post-war 
waters. The Communist Party (hereafter, SED) was institutionally weak and 
lacked popular support. Hence, it sought to avoid unnecessary challenges from 
the Church in an effort to build support. As a type of  participatory religious policy, 
the SED extended an olive branch to the Church and publicly supported its 
participation in the establishment of  the new state. 
Yugoslav religious policy from 1945 to the mid-1950s can be characterized 
as extremely repressive. Since Tito’s partisans had secured Western support in 
their struggle against fascism, their power base required less consolidation in 
the post-war period. Still, Yugoslav communists viewed religious institutions 
with trepidation since some segments of  the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) 
and, more notably, the Catholic Church had aligned themselves with anti-
Yugoslav forces. Yugoslav religious policy in this initial period, by virtue of  its 
repressiveness, re-entrenched the Churches in a critical posture vis-à-vis the 
state, giving them no other options but to embrace nationalism. 
The second condition accounts for how the regimes dealt with their national 
Churches from the mid-1950s to the late-1980s. As public dissent against the 
regime and repression of  the Church became repetitive, party leaders were forced 
to employ different methods to pacify unrest and suppress challenges to their 
authority. As a means of  restoring order and preserving a good international 
reputation, the option emerged to engage the Church as the only mediator 
between the state and protestors. As multiple incidents of  protest and unrest 
occurred and as non-Church oppositional groups sought protection in Church 
spaces, communicative cooperation between Church and state became more 
robust.4 Each profi ted from this back-and-forth relationship: the state was able 
to re-establish its authority, while the Church received considerable concessions 
4  John T.S. Madeley, Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of  Neutrality (London: Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 13.
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and established its role as chief  mediator, thereby becoming useful to the state 
and indeed almost indispensable.
Within this second typology, my cases bifurcate along two distinct lines: 
inclusive and exclusionary engagement. Regimes that inclusively engage include 
their religious groups in ending periods of  national unrest make them part of  
the confi dence-building process after periods of  violence. Going against Marxist 
ideology, the East German regimes willingly assigned the Church the role of  
primary negotiator in mediation. By the late 1980s, as the East German regime 
reverted to repressive measures against opposition, the Protestant Church carefully 
articulated liberal-democratic demands, such as respect for human rights, freedom 
of  expression and non-violence, often phrased in masterfully-expressed socialist 
language. However, since the Protestant Church had experienced signifi cant 
drops in Church membership, the SED was not constrained to seek out the 
Church’s good offi ces for challenges to regime authority. The weak position of  
the Church meant that inclusive regime engagement was possible. Moreover, 
East Germany could embrace a more receptive stance to the Church, when its 
own institutions were unsuccessful in responding to oppositional challenge. This 
institutional weakness necessitated inclusionary engagement. 
Yugoslavia’s exclusionary regime engagement stands in stark contrast. High levels 
of  Church repression from 1945 to 1953 were replaced in the mid-1950s by 
liberalization and political decentralization within the party and its federal-level 
and republic-level institutions. After two decades of  repression, church life was 
suddenly allowed to expand, and this opened the door for initial critical expression. 
Congruent with its refusal to incorporate the Churches into the governance of  
immediate post-war Yugoslavia, Tito and Yugoslav communists never looked 
upon Church leaders as mediators in times of  unrest. Unable to erase prior 
repression and having offered a maximum amount of  space for Church activity, 
the regime could neither regain the confi dence of  the Church, nor could it offer 
concessions. The regime lost the carrot and the stick. This opened up avenues 
for Church spaces to embrace critical stances against religious policy by using 
language and symbols that questioned and ultimately rejected the supra-ethnic 
Yugoslav mantra of  “brotherhood and unity.” Since both the Serbian Orthodox 
Church (SOC) and the Croatian Catholic Church had been thoroughly excluded 
from statecraft, there was neither signifi cant sympathy nor convincing incentive 
for them to intervene on behalf  of  a weakened regime, which they had never 
viewed as a social partner. 
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East German Participatory Church–State Engagement: 1945–1953
From its inception, the SED was faced with the daunting task of  convincing 
the public of  its socialist mission, while concomitantly discrediting Western 
democratic legitimacy. Working from such a weakened position in an ideological 
minefi eld, it was necessary to concede substantial points from its party platform 
by acknowledging “a special German road to socialism.”5 SED General-Secretary 
Erich Honecker refl ects:
We calculated that the situation in Germany at that time did not 
provide the necessary requirements for the immediate establishment 
of  socialism. That’s why the goal of  the German Communist Party 
(KPD) was to create an antifascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary 
republic with all the democratic rights and freedoms for the people.6
Behind the façade, hardliners altered the party’s institutional core, securing 
a maximum amount of  space in all realms of  political, public and private life.7 
Religious policy would be the only exception. In July 1946, Central Committee 
documents demonstrate the policy of  the regime of  binding the Church to the 
new state:
Churches have a stake in East Germany’s reconstruction. Their positive 
cooperation is to be welcomed… Reasonable requests by the Church 
for the return of  occupied Church buildings for religious purposes 
should receive support from our representatives in administration, in 
command structures and in the SMAD.8
Spaces for political participation corresponded to physical spaces at the 
national level. Properties belonging to convicted Nazi party members and 
estates larger than 100 hectares were summarily brought under governmental 
5 Monika Kaiser, “Change and Continuity in the Development of  the Socialist Unity Party of  Germany,” 
Journal of  Contemporary History 30 (1995): 688.
6 Erich Honecker, Aus meinem Leben (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988), 181.
7 Monika Kaiser, “Die Zentrale der Diktatur – organisatorische Weichenstellung, Strukturen und 
Kompetenzen der SED-Führung in der SBZ/DDR,” in Historische DDR-Forschung: Aufsätze und Studien, ed. 
Jürgen Kocka (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 78–79.
8 Gerhard Besier, Der SED-Staat und die Kirche: Der Weg in die Anpassung (Munich: Bertelsmann Verlag, 
1993), 55.
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administration.9 However, so as not to disturb the delicate Church-state balance, 
the SED exempted all Church properties from land reforms.10 As a further measure 
of  avoiding confrontation, GDR security organs protected the Church from 
intervention. In January 1947, Soviet and East German offi cials established the 
K-5 security apparatus (a precursor to the Ministry for State Security, or Stasi) 
under the command of  the Soviet–East German Central Administration of  
the Interior.11 K-5 contained special units for de-Nazifi cation, the elimination 
of  political opponents and monitoring the Evangelical Church.12 To avoid 
potentially explosive situations, all interaction between K-5 offi cials and the 
Church required high-ranking approval from the Ministry of  Interior. 
Not only were its institutional autonomy and organizational structure left 
intact, but the Church reclaimed and expanded its pre-war position. Properties 
confi scated by the Nazis were returned to the Church and theological centers, 
which had been closed during the war, reassumed full activity.13 The SED granted 
construction permits for new buildings and provided funding for damaged 
dioceses.14 With state collection agencies placed at the Church’s disposal, Church 
coffers were replenished with the reintroduction of  Church taxes. Moreover, 
unlike the other Allied sectors, the Evangelical Church was free to introduce 
pastoral care service for university students.15 Lastly, Church radio programs, 
newsletters, periodicals and newspapers further attest to the regime’s desire to 
avoid confl ict with the Church.16
The offi cial founding of  the GDR on October 7, 1949 and the period of  
Stalinization rapidly consolidated party structures and vigorously centralized all 
state institutions. The SED injected a new ideological moniker in public debate: 
pacifi st policy (Friedenspolitik), upon which it crafted its utopian commitment 
9  Arnd Bauerkämper, “Bodenreform und Kollektivierung,” in Handwörterbuch zur ländlichen Gesellschaft in 
Deutschland, ed. Stephan Beetz, Kai Brauer, and Claudia Neu (Berlin: VS Verlag, 2005), 17–18. 
10  Clemens Vollnhals, “Zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation: Zur Kirchenpolitik von KPD/SED 
und SMAD in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone,” Deutschland Archiv 27 (1994): 486. 
11  Monika Tanztscher, “In der Ostzone wird ein neuer Apparat aufgebaut: Die Gründung des DDR-
Staatssicherheitsdienstes,” Deutschland Archiv 31, no. 1 (1998): 48–49. 
12  Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Maasenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv/SAPMO-BArch, 
nr. 002071, Establishment of  Division E in Department V, 1947. 
13  Detlef  Pollack, Kirche in der Organisationsgesellschaft: zum Wandel der gesellschaftlichen Lage der evangelischen 
Kirchen in der DDR (Berlin: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1994), 95. 
14  “Kirchen entstehen neu!” Die Kirche, October 30, 1949, 1.
15  “Tätigkeit des Evangelischen Konsistoriums Berlin-Brandenburg,” Provinzialsynode Berlin-Brandenburg 
1951 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1951), 27. 
16  Pollack, Kirche in der Organisationsgesellschaft, 96.
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to the advancement of  peace. ‘Peace committees’ and public panel discussions 
on non-violence were established statewide to disseminate the regime’s pacifi st 
message. Though aimed at external threats, East German pacifi sm discreetly 
targeted domestic provocateurs with links to the West. 
During this Kirchenkampf  period, the repression of  the Church became more 
direct. Seeking to create a cadre of  regime-friendly priests, the regime kept them 
under active surveillance and assessed their attitudes, which were characterized 
either as progressive or “reactionary” (critical of  the regime).17 This would later 
create fi ssures among East German bishoprics: Berlin-Brandenburg Bishop Otto 
Dibelius was a defi ant critic of  East German communism, while, for example, 
Bishop of  Thüringen, Moritz Mitzenheim, followed a much more conciliatory, 
less-critical line.18
The 1949 East German constitution guaranteed the separation of  Church 
and state. This afforded the SED a legal justifi cation offi cially to include Marxist 
scientifi c materialism and atheism in all school curricula. This prompted several 
synods in 1951 to issue letters of  protest:
The constitutionally guaranteed right to the freedom of  religion is 
effectively removed, so school lesson plans recognize only historical 
and dialectical materialism. We realize that belief  is not for everyone… 
but we request that no one be pressured to accept the absence of  
faith. The freedom of  belief  in schools can only exist, if  instruction 
in all subjects is carried out in such a way so that Christians and non-
Christians can participate with the same amount of  personal freedom.19
Still, the SED demonstrated veiled caution by instructing teachers and 
school directors to “avoid under all circumstances creating the impression of  a 
state-controlled campaign against religion.”20
The SED also pressured the Church to move its headquarters from the 
British Sector to the territory within GDR borders. Even before the 1949 state 
declaration, Evangelical leaders refused to recognize inter-zonal borders, since 
17  Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (BLA), Repository 203, nr. 144, Positive zur Nationalen Front 
eingestellte Pfarrer des Landes Brandenburg. 
18  Pollack, Kirche in der Organizationsgesellschaft, 131.
19  Ralf  Altenhof, “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland,” Die 
Enquetekommission des deutschen Bundestages (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993): 164.
20  SAPMO-BArch, Sensitive Information – Directive from the Central Committee of  the SED and the 
Department of  People’s Education to regional SED party offi ces and Departments of  People’s Education, 
January 7, 1950.
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several parishes straddled the frontiers.21 Party leaders demanded a relocation so 
that
priests in leading positions of  the National Front and peace committees 
will no longer be hindered by restrictions, reprimands and threats from 
the Church leadership in West Berlin… The ministerial council for the 
province of  Brandenburg is of  the opinion that it is no longer tolerable 
that the West Berlin Church administration threatens its priests, citizens 
of  the GDR, simply because they fi ght for peace.22
The SED countered with threats of  allocating funding only for religious 
groups that were in SBZ.23 Pastors and theology students from the West were 
prevented from entering the East.24 While workers easily traveled to their factories 
in East Berlin, Church employees were singled out as undesirable visitors. 
Against this growing tension, high-ranking Evangelical offi cials agreed on 
June 6, 1952 to an informal exchange with state representatives in the home of  
Brandenburg General-Superintendent Braun. Despite the informal nature and 
the palpable strains, both entities conducted an unexpectedly cordial discussion. 
The Church emphatically expressed its concerns regarding the wellbeing of  its 
youth, travel restrictions for West Berlin priests and the party-run Free German 
Youth’s agitation against the Church youth movement (Junge Gemeinde).25 Bishop 
of  Berlin-Brandenburg and chairman of  the Council of  the Evangelical Church 
in Germany Dibelius unambiguously confi rmed the Church’s bond to the Holy 
Scriptures as its sole source of  guidance. He reiterated the independent nature 
of  the Church and its resistance to political manipulation.26 Provincial Vice-
Minister Jahn of  Brandenburg urged the Church to repeal its 1950 consistorial 
order blocking priests from joining political groups.27 Though it concluded with 
little more than a handshake, this micro-level encounter proved that informal 
agent-to-agent dialogue was not only possible, but would be the necessary 
mechanism for future interaction and reconciliation.
21  Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 1998), 76. 
22  “Kirchenleitung gehört in das Land Brandenburg!” Märkische Volksstimme December 6, 1950, 2.
23  BLA, Repository 202A, nr. 531, Letter from the Brandenburg Provincial Prime Minister to Evangelical 
Superintendents, Priests and Parish Commissioners, Pg 2. January 26, 1951. 
24  BLA, Repository 202G, nr. 45, Special Report on the meeting between state representatives and those 
of  the Church on 06.06.1952 in the home of  Superintendent-General Braun, Potsdam, June 10, 1952. 
25  Ibid.
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid.
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By 1953, East German mismanagement had produced a struggling, 
dysfunctional economy that ideologically diverted resources to heavy industry 
instead of  addressing consumer needs, and this in turn created shortages of  
basic goods and food, as well as prohibitive taxes. Over 330,000 young, educated 
members of  the East German workforce left for the West. Due to overzealous 
goals, the SED brought the country to near economic collapse. According to an 
SED document, Ulbricht recognized the possible gains to be won from policy 
“liberalization”:
It is not necessarily effective to lead a campaign of  protest resolutions 
and demonstrations against Church leadership. Instead of  intervening 
in religious events and Church services, religious policy should publish 
concrete evidence of  the subversive activity of  individual priests.”28 
We are neither leading a Church confl ict, nor do we recognize any 
such Church confl ict. We are simply looking for certain bases of  the 
enemy… And when the Church positions itself  in solidarity with such 
people, well then it’s too bad for the Church.29
 
Ulbricht and other high-ranking SED offi cials were ordered to report to 
Moscow on June 2, 1953. Fearing a collapse of  the GDR, the Soviet Council 
of  Ministers demanded a reversal of  SED Church-state relations.30 As a result, 
the SED announced a high-level church-state summit scheduled for June 10, 
1953, just days before the June 17, 1953 Berlin Workers Revolt. However, the 
eleventh-hour implementation of  the Council’s orders proved to be insuffi cient 
in averting the revolt.31
Leading up to 1953, the Evangelical Church expanded its position and social 
presence to levels not seen since before the Third Reich and, as the only other 
signifi cant social stakeholder, it tacitly participated in the formation of  the new 
state. Moreover, the regime’s calculated policy of  non-confrontation allowed 
28  SAPMO-BArch, Repository IV 2/3/380, “Opinion of  the Schwerin District Administration Report 
and the Gera District Administration on the Reactionary Activity of  Priests,” Protocol of  the SEC Central 
Committee, May 4, 1953.
29 Martin Georg Goerner, Die Kirche als Problem der SED: Strukturen kommunistischer Herrschaftausübung 
gegenüber der evangelischen Kirche 1945 bis 1958 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 109.
30  Christian F. Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering: the United States and the East German 
Uprising of  1953,” German Studies Review 19, no. 1 (1996): 63. 
31  “Kommuniqué der Sitzung des SED-Politbüros vom 9 Juni 1953,” Dokumente der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands: Beschlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkommittees sowie seines Politbüros und seines 
Sekretariats 4 (Berlin: Berlin, 1953), 428.
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the Church to maintain institutional autonomy in its decision-making processes, 
social outreach and public activities. By actively seeking out the Church’s support 
in crafting a new, socialist German state, the SED’s overarching design of  
integration produced only low-levels of  anxiety among its decision-makers. At 
the time of  Stalin’s death in March 1953, Church-based free spaces were intact 
and vibrant.
East German Inclusive Engagement from 1953–1989
As part of  the SED’s inclusive engagement, two salient features emerged in this 
period. Firstly, the state sought to elevate socialism above religion by coopting 
progressive pastors from ones that were critical of  the regime. This policy 
of  differentiation gave rise to the second feature of  this period: conciliatory, 
cooperative factions in Church ranks, which led to visible fi ssures among Church 
leaders. Inclusive engagement could take place with a weakened Church not only 
because secularization became an increasingly measurable characteristic of  East 
German society after the mid-1950s, but also because the state had succeeded in 
changing people’s attitudes toward religion.
State-lead high-level talks of  June 10, 1953 signaled the adoption of  an 
approach based more on dialogue. The resulting communiqué codifi ed an 
agreement, whereby both entities negotiated a halt in all repressive action against 
Church youth. Imprisoned Church members were released without delay32 and 
students who had been expelled or blacklisted could resume their studies.33 
Teachers, sacked based on religious belief, were reinstated.34 The Central 
Committee also promised to refrain from intervening in Church institutions.35 In 
exchange, Church leaders agreed to temper their reproaches of  the regime, limit 
the use of  the pulpit and retract their criticisms of  economic and political life.36 
Leaders from Church and state together released a joint statement celebrating 
32  Kommunique der Sitzung des SED-Politbüros, Juni 9, 1953, 428.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid.
35  “Entschließung der 15 Tagung des SED-Zentralkomitees vom 24. bis. 26. Juli 1953 – Der neue 
Kurs und die Aufgaben der Partei,” Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands: Beschlüsse und 
Erklärungen des Zentralkommittees sowie seines Politbüros und seines Sekretariats 4 (Berlin: SED, 1953), 449.
36  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2188, SED Provincial Secretariat’s Report entitled “On the Activity of  the 
Church after the Communique from June 10, 1953 and Suggestions for Improvements in the Arena of  
Religious Policy” Potsdam, January 8, 1954.
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the fruitful discussions, in which the regime had re-instated the Church as a 
social stakeholder.37
The June talks proved to be nothing more than a stopgap measure. Stasi 
directives reveal that it maintained its prior characterization of  Church leaders 
as “reactionary, imperialist intelligence agents working in support of  criminal 
activities against the GDR.”38 Open confl ict with the Church was to be replaced 
with a covert, operative approach: publicly demonstrating willingness to engage 
in dialogue, while remaining inwardly uncompromising. 
In 1954, alongside the Ministry of  Interior, other state institutions were 
to craft religious policy. The Department for Church Relations served as the 
government mediator between the General-Secretary, the politburo, the Central 
Committee and the Church. The regime then established the Working Group 
for Church Questions of  the SED’s Central Committee (die Arbeitsgruppe für 
Kirchenfragen or AK), which was to handle Church–state relations, monitor the 
political activities of  religious groups and report their fi ndings directly to the 
highest levels of  government. While the AK set the overall policy tone,39 the 
Council of  Ministers created the State Secretariat for Church Questions (SSCQ) 
in 1957, which served as the state contact and intermediary for Church leaders.40 
By 1960, several theologians began to search for an identity in the now 
solidifi ed Communist state. Günter Jacob, Evangelical General-Superintendent 
of  Cottbus, introduced the fi rst interpretations of  the Scriptures into the 
Church–state debate. By liberating itself  from political manipulation, the 
Church could create a space for itself  in which “the true, apolitical message of  
the Evangelical scriptures” could fi nd expression.41 At an extraordinary session 
of  the EKD 1956 Synod in Berlin, the Union of  Evangelical Priests in the GDR 
(Bund evangelischer Pfarrer der DDR or BEP-DDR) claimed that “concessions 
for greater religious freedoms within the realm of  dialectical Marxist authority” 
37  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2187, Bishop Otto Dibelius’ pastoral letter entitled “To all Parishes in 
Germany,” Berlin, June 12, 1953.
38  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2188, SED Provincial Secretariat’s Report entitled “On the Activity of  the 
Church after the Communique from June 10, 1953 and Suggestions for Improvements in the Arena of  
Religious Policy” Potsdam, January 8, 1954.
39  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DY 30/J IV 2/2/516, Protocol nr. 62/56 of  the Meeting of  the Politburo 
of  the Central Committee, November 27, 1956. 
40  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DC 20/4/228, Decision 53/14 of  the Council of  Ministers for the 
Appointment of  a State Secretariat for Church Questions, February 21, 1957.
41  Günter Jacob, Der Christ und die Mächte (Stuttgart: Lettner Verlag, 1960), 330.
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were only possible if  the individual… respected and reciprocally recognized the 
given borders between public life and the space of  pure religion.”42 
We are separate from any hyphenated-form of  Christianity, unbound 
from a fantastical, civic-capitalist system, foreign to Evangelicals. We 
seek neither to be a center of  conspiracy, nor a state-run propaganda 
institute. Rather, we in the BEP-DDR seek to offer brotherly help, 
to ponder theologically the existential question of  the Church in our 
republic and at the same time to be active as loyal and responsible GDR 
citizens. This union works for freedom in the world and supports the 
efforts of  the German Democratic Republic towards this end, while 
being obligated to the social renewal that is taking place in the GDR.43
The Church’s contribution to the new path took form in the fi rst observable 
expressions of  a Kirche im Sozialismus, a position that was neither supportive of  
the regime, nor ostensibly against the regime, but rather existed parallel to it. 
Due to the SED’s initial skepticism, Church leaders sent a delegation led by 
bishops from Thuringia and Pomerania to participate in discussions with the 
Ministry of  Interior, SSCQ and the Council of  Ministers.44 The delegates at the 
Church–state talks agreed to a monumental joint communiqué on July 21, 1958. 
Unlike the June 10, 1953 agreement, the church successfully weakened the state. 
The Church offered its most demonstrative statement yet:
The representatives of  the Evangelical Church in the GDR declare that 
the Church, with all means at its disposal, strives for peace amongst all 
peoples and hence is principally in agreement with the peaceful efforts 
of  the GDR and its government. In accordance with their conscience, 
Christians shall fulfi ll their civic duties based on the legal foundations. 
They respect the socialist development and shall contribute to the 
peaceful construction of  civic life.45
Short of  declaring loyalty, the Church recognized the existing political 
conditions and Marxist socialism. Regime offi cials promised only to review 
42 Günter Jacob, “Der Raum für das Evangelium in Ost und West,” Kirchliches Jahrbuch 1956 (Gütersloh: 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1956): 13.
43 Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin (EZB), Repository 4, nr. 666, Newsletter nr. 1 from BEP-DDR in 
the German Democratic Republic to all Pastors, June 19–20, 1958. 
44 Besier, Der SED-Staat und die Kirche, 71.
45 Kirchliches Jahrbuch 1958, 241.
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certain measures taken in public education and reiterated their constitutional 
responsibility to protect the rights of  religious practice.46 This stood in stark 
contrast to the 1953 point-by-point retraction of  repressive measures against 
the Church. The policy of  differentiation had accomplished its goals. Church 
membership and congregations fell rapidly throughout the 1950s and 1960s.47 
Only one-third of  the children from religious households were confi rmed in 
the Church, while the Jugendweihe exploded in popularity from 26 percent of  
school classes in 1955 to over 80 percent in 1960.48 With the beginning of  
the construction of  the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, rather than expand 
its administrative reach to near totalitarian domination, the regime chose 
begrudgingly to accommodate the Church.49 
Under state expansion, the SED began to militarize society: military service 
in the People’s National Army (NVA) was mandated for all men in January 
1962 without the option of  conscientious objection.50 Since the majority of  
objectors were from Christian households or theology students, the move gave 
the Churches a new lifeline. Church leaders approached the regime about the 
negative effects of  forcing Christians to carry arms against their will.51 Ulbricht 
and the National Defense Council, keen on avoiding confrontations, conceded 
their position to the Church on September 7, 1964 and ordered the creation 
of  unarmed NVA ‘construction units’ that exempted Christians from weapons 
exercises. The Bausoldaten were tasked with building military installments, housing 
units and transporting material. With this, the GDR became the only Communist 
state that allowed for conscientious objection.
By the late 1960s, the Evangelical Churches decided territorially and 
institutionally to re-organize themselves from the all-German Evangelical Church 
of  Germany (EKD). After much debate, East German bishops in 1969 formally 
separated themselves from the EKD, establishing the regime-friendly Union of  
Evangelical Churches in the GDR (BEK-DDR). Despite the BEK’s separation 
from the EKD, the two entities maintained close lines of  communication up to 
1989.
46 Ibid.
47 “Statistical Report on Exiting the Church – 1950 to 1956,” Amtsblatt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 
19. no. 6 (1958): 17.
48 Pollack, Kirche in der Organizationsgesellschaft, 150.
49 “Programm der SED,” Neues Deutschland  January  25, 1963, 1.
50 Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989, 187.
51 Ibid.
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In 1971, Walter Ulbricht’s successor, Erich Honecker, sought a more 
conciliatory approach to Church–state relations. His approach included the 
establishment of  a Church media service,52 construction permits and the 
expansion of  the Church’s presence in religion-free “workers cities.” Moreover, 
in hopes of  improving the GDR’s international image, Evangelical bishops’ were 
encouraged to participate in international ecumenical conferences.53 Church–
state interaction demonstrated the GDR’s new readiness to seek a modus vivendi. 
For its part, the Church again expressed its readiness to
neither infl ate, nor downplay the existing contrasts between Marxist-
socialism and theology. Neither option is in our interest. Rather, 
we need better to understand what occurs in this country, which is 
also our home. We shall soon discover the real commonalities in our 
responsibility to man and those social areas, where we are needed. In the 
past, anti-communism distorted our vision from our real opportunities 
and true challenges.54
The purpose of  the Church was to be fi rmly located in working within East 
German society for the good of  its citizens.55
On August 18, 1976, Church–state relations were profoundly unsettled by 
an act of  self-immolation. Before pouring petrol over himself, Pastor Oskar 
Brüsewitz had unrolled a banner with the words “the Church in the GDR 
condemns communist repression of  school children!” While the regime claimed 
the priest suffered from delusion, it feared a public protest, a damaged international 
image. Honecker and Church representatives met for another round of  talks on 
March 6, 1978, which introduced conditions that set the stage for the largest 
expansion of  Church space.56 In quid pro quo¸ the Church agreed to respect 
the SED’s request to halt all political criticism and accept the existing power 
relations of  the GDR. In turn, the SED offered a lengthy list of  concessions and 
policy liberalizations, including more construction permits, 2.2 million Marks for 
52  EZB, Repository 4, nr. 304, Letters between the Berlin Church Council and Reinhard Henkys of  the 
Berlin Arbeitsgemeinschaft für kirchliche Publizistik, July 12, 1973.
53  “Hohe DDR-Kirchenvertreter besuchen Genf  – Ökumenische Verbindungen sollen ausgebaut 
werden, Werben für Anerkennung,” Frankfurter Rundschau March 22, 1972, 1.
54  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DO4/320, State Committee for Radio Services – Department of  
Monitoring, July 2, 1971.
55  “Kirche will in der Gesellschaft der DDR künftig mitreden,” Der Tagesspiegel July 6, 1971, 45.
56  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DY IV 2/2036/49, Our Approach to the Talks with Representatives of  
the Evangelical Church of  the GDR, May 10, 1977.
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restoration projects, lifelong health care for all Church employees, pastoral care 
in prisons and retirement homes, pay increases for priests57 and greater access 
to state media for holy days.58 While Honecker viewed the talks as a “crowning 
moment and new beginning,” the Church secured a long sought after document 
that better outlined its legal position in the GDR.59
Despite the March 1978 talks, the SED became increasingly suspicious of  
Church-based peace initiatives60 and “the serious security concern of  broader 
peace movements solidifying around Church.”61 Indeed, by 1982, a number 
of  students, theologians, Church congregants and veteran Bausoldaten had 
found a protected space in the Church.62 Ulrike Poppe, founder of  “Women for 
Peace” and the “Initiative for Peace and Human Rights,” recognized that the 
existence of  these groups was best guaranteed under the protective umbrella 
of  the Church.63 Equally, Church leadership was aware of  the fate that would 
await these individuals, if  the activism and pacifi st message of  these groups 
were to take on stronger contours. The Church’s protective stance assumed a 
more communicative quality, acting as the mediator and ‘translator’ between 
the two entities.64 Bishops oversaw cooperation among the groups, warned of  
risks, advised the opposition and the regime on better forms of  communication 
and diluted their messages in the interest of  maintaining public order. Despite 
this protective cover, oppositional groups had grown skeptical of  becoming too 
compromised by the Church. Poppe was aware that “oppositional groups were 
at times afraid of  the Church’s paternalist role vis-à-vis East German human 
rights groups.”65 Hence, the relationship between Church and opposition was 
not without contention. Nevertheless, if  peaceful resolutions to confl ict and 
57  SAPMO-BArch, Repository  DY 30 IV 2/2/1740, Decision of  the Politburo supporting an increase 
in basic wages of  Evangelical regional Churches, August 22, 1978.
58  Ibid., Addendum 1 on the Commitments to Concerns Brought by the Union of  Evangelical Churches 
in the German Democratic Republic.
59  Bundesbeauftrage für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, (BStU), Protocol from a speech held by Bishop Albrecht Schönherr on the 
importance of  the March 6, 1978 talks, MfS Document 8103, October 10, 1986.
60  SAPMO-BArch, Internal Party Document – Information on the Relationship between State and the 
Evangelical Church in the GDR, DY 2/3/119, December 2, 1980.
61  Ibid.
62  Interview with Manfred Stolpe and Joachim Heise, July 14, 2008.
63  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
64  Interview with Manfred Stolpe, July 14, 2008.
65  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
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the avoidance of  human rights violations were topics for both Church and 
opposition, they had now become salient issues between Church and state.
The SED’s lack of  preparation in adapting to a third, new critical element 
became apparent. By 1982, Stasi documents warned of  Church-based “enemy-
negative forces attempting to establish an independent movement for peace 
under the guise of  pacifi sm.”66 Attempts were made to remove students from 
schools and universities based on membership in illegal organizations, while 
other peace activists were taken into police custody. The SED resorted to more 
extreme measures: the regime quietly offered leading members of  oppositional 
groups travel permits or stipends to study in the West; others were forcefully 
expatriated.67 But even state security organs feared that overt repressive measures 
could push the Church to become confrontational. Intelligence reports pressed 
the SED to engage in another round of  talks with the SSCQ and Church leaders 
to ease tensions. Stasi reports even suggested using the Church leadership to steer 
the peace movements away from the public sphere.68 The regime desperately 
resorted to its old Janus-faced playbook: it actively engaged with Church leaders, 
using their mediation between regime and opposition, while cracking down 
on those who drifted beyond the accepted boundaries.69 Police and Stasi units 
increasingly stormed Churches and parish halls and confi scated printing presses 
and Church libraries. At the Zionskirche in East Berlin, Stasi units arrested 
members of  a Church-based environmental initiative. The regime’s desperate 
show of  force not only made it more dependent on the Church’s communicative 
role, it also improved the Church’s image and increased the public’s solidarity 
with it.
By late 1989, Evangelical Churches were ready to channel massive public 
frustration peacefully and prevent a potential violent state intervention. In 
Leipzig, Monday prayers for peace at the Nikolaikirche by October 9, 1989 drew 
70,000 demonstrators; one week later, over 120,000 gathered before the Church. 
Trying to stave off  unrest, the politburo replaced Honecker with Egon Krenz 
on October 18. With change evident, over 320,000 called for peaceful reforms 
in Leipzig. Tensions grew to a fever pitch as rumors spread amongst the peaceful 
66  BStU, Internal document from Ministry of  State Security to all working units of  the Stasi, MfS 
Document 7604, March 17, 1982.
67  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
68  BStU, Suggestions of  talks with the State Secretary for Church Questions, Comrade Gysi, with the 
bishops of  the provincial Evangelical Churches in the DDR, MfS Document 7605.
69  BStU, Quarterly Report – Church and Religious Communities in the GDR – Excerpts of  an interview 
with Berlin-Brandenburg Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, MfS Document 8103, April 1985. 
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protestors that units of  the NVA, riot police and undercover Stasi agents had 
been given orders to use force to control the growing protest.70 But by now, 
word had spread throughout the GDR that Church buildings and squares were 
safe areas for expressing popular frustration and desires for reform. 
The GDR reached a point of  no return on November 9, 1989, when Party 
Secretary Krenz ordered the opening of  border crossings between East and 
West Berlin. Upon hearing the news from West German media sources, East 
Germans gathered at the border crossings by the thousands. Overwhelmed East 
German border guards, at fi rst unsure how to proceed, yielded to the swelling 
masses. Once the barriers were raised, West and East Berliners were united in a 
celebration of  peace.
Post-War Yugoslav Religious Policy: More Soviet than Thou 
In this section I claim that a unique set of  processes stemming from Yugoslavia’s 
particular Church–state engagement planted the seeds for the exclusionary 
characteristics of  Church-based free spaces that later generated nationalist 
sentiment. Yugoslav religious policy was not marked by public agreements or 
joint communiqués resulting from regular high-level Church-state negotiations. 
Once the country swung from a repressive model to an open, quasi-Western 
one, freedoms in economics, labor, media and travel undermined the necessity 
to lodge human rights complaints. By liberalizing religious policy, Yugoslav 
communists gave up an important bargaining chip: they could not offer 
concessions to Churches, since the Churches already enjoyed the most open 
religious atmosphere in the communist world.
From end of  the war to the late 1950s, the Yugoslav regime maintained a 
posture of  extreme repression. The decision to take immediate measures against 
the Catholic and Orthodox Churches was a manifestation of  Tito’s distrust and 
the Yugoslav Communist Party’s (CPY) rapid consolidation of  power. Neither 
the Catholic Church nor the SOC became participants in the reconstruction of  
the new Yugoslav state. As a result, the regime’s position offered the Churches 
no other option but to look upon the authorities with suspicion, if  not enmity. 
Such distrust bolstered the Churches’ unwillingness to support the regime, which 
70  Interview with Hans Modrow, September 2008.
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created a crucial by-product for later periods: the regime could never request the 
Churches’ mediation in times of  unrest.71 
Two points are crucial to understanding the post-war phase in Yugoslav 
Church-state relations. Firstly, the CPY systematically applied the Soviet 
playbook, which erased the political landscape of  subversives and prevented 
religio-nationalist rhetoric from challenging the state, a type of  post-war tabula 
rasa devoid of  opposition.72 The second approach involved state institutions 
confronting the Churches through nuanced repression that targeted their greatest 
weakness. This individualized method removed the presence and visibility 
of  Church space from the public sphere. In 1945, the Yugoslav Council of  
Ministers established the Federal Commission for Church Questions (SKVP), 
which passed down party directives to republic-level Commissions for Religious 
Relations (KVP), the purpose of  which was to
research all questions concerning life outside the religious communities, 
their inter-confessional relations and the position of  the Churches vis-
à-vis the state and the People’s authorities, as well as the preparation 
for all legislative solutions on relations between religious communities 
and the state.73
Yugoslav authorities considered religious groups to be a security threat 
and therefore placed the SKVP under the command of  the Ministry for State 
Security (UDBA). Authorities detained, physically assaulted and murdered 
hundreds of  Orthodox and Catholic bishops, priests, nuns, and laypersons. 
Judges in politically rigged trials speedily handed down execution sentences and 
lengthy jail times.74 Grand show trials served as a means of  eradicating Church-
71  Interviews with Bishop of  Australia and New Zealand of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, Irinej 
Dobrijevic, April 2007 and the Vicar General of  the Catholic Archdiocese of  Sarajevo, Monsignor Mato 
Zovkić, September 2010.
72  Darko Bekich, “Soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the Balkans,” Annals of  the American Academy of  Political 
and Social Science 481 (1985), 2.
73  Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Repository 144, no. 1-1, The Presidium of  the Council of  Ministers of  the 
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia brings forth the decree on the establishment of  a federal commission for 
religious questions – Article 1 (Pretsedništvo Ministarskog Saveta Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije 
donosi uredbu o osnivanja držvane komisje za verska pitanja – Član 1), September 21, 1945.
74  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1-4a, Executive of  the Bishops’ Conference in Zagreb (Predsjedništvo Biskupih 
Konferencija u Zagrebu), no. 64, May 8, 1945.
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linked regime-opponents.75 In a politically rigged court in 1946, anti-communist 
Royalist Četnik commander Draža Mihailović was found guilty of  collaborating 
with Nazi Germany and summarily executed by fi ring squad. Mihailović’s stature 
in the SOC was considerable. The SOC leadership perceived the court’s decision 
as a volley across its bow. 
Similarly, the 1946 trial of  Catholic Archbishop of  Zagreb Aloizije Stepinac 
for his alignment with German and Croatian fascists highlighted the regime’s 
intent to silence any opposition. On May 8, 1945, Stepinac publicly demanded an 
explanation for the maltreatment of  Catholic priests,76 which was followed by a 
pastoral letter slamming the regime’s repression.77 However, he offered no word 
of  atonement to either the regime or the SOC for wartime atrocities perpetrated 
by Croatian clergy.78 As a result, Tito personally engaged him to consider the 
possibility of  an independent, Yugoslav Church.79 Meeting with Stepinac, Tito states
the Church should be more national, more adapted to the nation: 
perhaps you are surprised that I approach the subject of  nationality 
with such emphasis. Too much blood fl owed, I have seen too much 
suffering of  the people, and I would like the Catholic clergy in Croatia 
to be more deeply linked in its national feeling with the people than 
it now is […] We want to create a great community of  South Slavs in 
which there will be both Orthodox and Catholics […] linked with all 
the other Slavs.80
75  Dunja Melčić, “Abrechnungen mit den politischen Gegnern und die kommunistischen 
Nachkriegsverbrechen,” in Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf  und Konsequenzen, ed. idem 
(Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag, 1999), 198.
76  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1–3, Improving and renewing the Church – authorization for the collection 
of  necessary resources (Predmet: Popravk i obnova crkvi – dozvola sabiranja portrebnih sretstava), Letter 
from Stepinac to the Vlada and the republic-level Commission for Religious Affairs of  Croatia, August 14, 
1945.
77  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1–4, Pastoral Letter of  the Catholic Bishoprics of  Yugoslavia, Publication 
of  the Bishop’s Conference in Zagreb (Pastirsko Pismo Katoličkih Biskupa Jugoslavije, Izdano s Općih 
Biskupskih Konferencija u Zagrebu), September 20, 1945. Also see, Zvonimir Despot, Vrijeme Zločina: Novi 
Prilozi za Povijest Koprivničke Podravine 1941 – 1948 (Zagreb: Hrvatski Institut za Povijest, 2007), 258.
78  Milovan Djilas, Jahre der Macht: Im Jugoslawischen Kräftespiel – Memoiren 1945–1966 (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992), 56.
79  Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 562–63.
80  Stella Alexander, The Triple Myth: A Life of  Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), 117.
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This effort sought to “yugoslavize” the Church and, as was being done in 
the GDR, align it with the state’s new identity.81 After such repression, Stepinac 
refused any such agreement and was placed on trial for collaboration, the 
dissemination of  Fascist ideology in Church media and the forced conversion 
of  Orthodox citizens.82 Stepinac was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 
16 years of  hard labor followed by house arrest.
The CPY continued its drastic reduction of  Church space. Religious 
instruction in state-run secondary schools was discontinued in 1945 without 
negotiation.83 Partisan units physically removed all religious symbols from schools 
and public buildings and marriage documents were placed under civil code. A 
1947 federal law prohibited the public celebration of  religious holy days. Instead, 
the offi cial Socialist calendar replaced holy days with workdays.84 In 1949, the 
Ministry of  Education declared all theological faculties private institutions and 
removed them from public universities.85
The nationalization of  property rounded out the palette of  policy 
instruments. In a move against the Catholic Church, the army and security forces 
placed all Church-administered hospitals, nursing schools and pension homes 
under governmental administration. Moreover, chapels, prayer rooms, religious 
artwork and crosses in hospitals were removed and nuns, though still allowed 
to work, had to remove their habits and other displays of  religious symbolism.86 
The regime undertook a similar, nuanced measure against the SOC by targeting 
its property holdings, one of  its sources of  income. From 1946 onward, security 
forces again occupied hundreds of  SOC buildings, parish halls, secretariats and 
residencies.87 In Bosnia, over 140 Churches and offi ces were placed under rent-
81  Margareta Matijević, “Religious Communities in Croatia from 1945 to 1991: Social Casualty of  the 
Dissent Between Communist Authorities and Religious Communities’ Leadership,” Časopis sa Suvremenu 
Povijest 2, no. 1 (2006): 122.
82  Alexander, The Triple Myth, 146. 
83  Katarina Spehnjak, Javnost i Propaganda Narodna Fronta u Politici i Kulturi Hrvatske 1945–1952 (Zagreb, 
2002), 187–90.
84  Thomas Bremer, Kleine Geschichte der Religionen in Jugoslawien: Königreich-Kommunismus-Krieg (Freiburg: 
Herder Verlag), 86.
85  AJ, Inventory 144, no. 2-46, Briefi ng for the head of  the Federal Commission for Religious Questions 
on the current state of  Orthodox Faculty (Kratak referat o današnjem zalošnim stanju na našem Pravoslavnom 
Bogoslovskom Fakultetu), July 7, 1949. 
86  Matijević, Religious Communities in Croatia from 1945 to 1991, 125.
87  AJ, Inventory 144, Decrees from SKVP no. 534 and no. 68 of  1946 identifi ed these measures.
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free military and police occupation.88 In cases where non-military individuals 
occupied Church land, the regime refused requests for compensation.89 As the 
party predicted, critique of  this measure remained limited only to protest letters 
by the synod90 and Patriarch Gavrilo to the federal and the Serbian KVP.91
By 1953, the LCY had neutralized the last forms of  domestic opposition 
and now had a free hand in pursuing socio-economic policies, which anticipated 
a sharp about-face from centralized resource allocation to one of  “workers’ self-
managed” production.92 They laid the groundwork for political re-adjustments 
in Church-state relations. In 1953, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted the 
Law Concerning the Legal Status of  Religious Communities, which formalized the 
separation of  Church and state, guaranteed freedom of  conscience and religious 
belief  and stipulated the rights of  atheists and the consequences of  abusing 
religion for political purposes.93 By the late 1950s, the regime had increased the 
number of  construction permits and funds for damaged buildings.94 Lastly, the 
weekly newspapers, the Catholic Glas Koncila and the Orthodox Pravoslavlje were 
allowed to circulate in larger numbers.95
The Rise of  the Churches from 1966 to the Late 1980s
In 1966, the Fourth Plenum of  the Central Committee and the six republic 
Central Committees introduced extensive political liberalizations.96 Centrist 
factions gave way to decentralist forces that favored devolution of  powers to the 
88  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, List of  Church Buildings Occupied or Used by State Authorities (Spisak 
Crkvenih Zgrada Zauzetih i Upotreblijvih od Strane Gradjanskih Vlasti), February 1947.
89  Ibid.
90  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, Synod of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, no. 346, Letter of  protest from the 
synod of  the SOC to the republican-level KPV of  Serbia with a request to reverse the decrees, February 
11, 1947.
91  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, Synod of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, no. 1147, Letter of  protest to the 
Executive of  the Federal Government, March 31, 1947.
92  Thomas A. Marschak, “Centralized versus Decentralized Resource Allocation: The Yugoslav 
Laboratory,” The Quarterly Journal of  Economics 82 (1968): 566.
93   Radić, Država i Verske Zajednice, 1945–1970: Prvi Deo 1945–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za Novu Istoriju 
Srbije, 2002), 385–400.
94  Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 121. 
95  Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 194.
96  Radio Free Europe, Internal Affairs, Central Committee Plenums of  Yugoslavia’s Six Republics Approve Purge 
of  Ranković and Party Reforms, October 3, 1966: 1.
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republics.97 With this came a new stance on Church-state policy: the SKVP and 
KVPs were removed from UDBA oversight and transformed into independent 
governmental units, ending the regime’s security and intelligence gathering 
approach. State institutions were mandated to engage in dialogue, monitor media 
and manage Church life through quid pro quo, but also to prevent Churches from 
weighing in on social issues. With this change, the SOC and Croatian Church 
became less constrained in expanding Church media, holding public masses and 
criticizing the regime. One could hardly imagine a more comprehensive change.
Although calls for decentralization fi rst came from the Serbian and Slovenian 
parties, Croatian communists most demonstratively demanded for a loosening, 
beginning with appeals for a constitutionally recognized Croatian language, 
separate from its almost identical Serbian counterpart. This peaked with the 
Croatian Spring or Mass Movement (Masovni Pokret, Maspok) from 1967 to 1972, 
which took on more alarming contours. Calls were made for the establishment 
of  an independent Croatian national bank, greater autonomy in education and 
economic policy and territorial defense units.98 Maspok supporters criticized the 
Yugoslav National Bank’s distribution of  federal development funds to poorer 
regions, while extremist fractions demanded a separate seat at the United Nations 
and revisions of  offi cial Yugoslav history.99 
Maspok coincided with the rise of  the Catholic Church’s renewed organization 
of  large-scale masses and celebrations. A symbolic start took place with the Marian 
Congress and the consecration of  the holy shrine at Marija Bistrica in August 
1971 in front of  150,000 pilgrims.100 At the same time, Glas Koncila profi ted from 
limited state censorship by publishing criticisms of  Yugoslav socialism, while 
celebrating the upsurge as solidifying the Croatian nation. As violent Maspok 
demonstrations in Zagreb threatened to destabilize the regime in 1972, Tito 
quickly purged leaders en masse and imprisoned activists.101 Under the threat 
of  irredentism, Tito and Executive Bureau Secretary Stane Dolanc cleansed the 
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Croatian League of  Communists and other republican leagues.102 Faced with the 
threat of  violence, Yugoslav communists never requested mediation from the 
Church. Unlike in the GDR, in Yugoslavia there was no rapprochement between 
Tito and Catholic bishops to restore peace. Despite the regime’s later inclusion 
of  Maspok’s demands in the 1974 constitution, the crackdown shifted outlets 
for critical expression into the hands of  the Church.103
The Church wasted no time in expanding its free space. In September 1974, 
the episcopate began the Great Novena, celebrating 1,300 years of  Christianity. 
The icon of  Our Lady of  the Great Croatian Christian Covenant was paraded 
around the countryside, accompanied by liturgical celebrations, pastoral theater 
plays and a children’s educational course. Large Eucharistic festivals followed: 
the 1977 celebration of  King Zvonimir, the 1979 declaration of  the Year of  
Prince Branimir and the 1981 National Eucharistic Congresses in Split and 
Zagreb. The pinnacle was reached in September 1984 at the fi nal celebration of  
the Great Novena, where over 400,000 convened at Marija Bistrica. 
The SOC in this period became equally active with its social presence, 
organizing numerous public liturgies, jubilees and celebrations. In May 1968, 
the SOC organized a commemoration of  the ancient Serb ruler, Czar Dušan. In 
September 1969, the SOC celebrated the 750th anniversary of  autocephaly before 
a crowd of  nearly 10,000 Orthodox faithful. The jubilee was continued at the Žiča 
monastery, where the conciliatory Archbishop German stated the following:
All who live with us here in our common home, in our common 
fatherland of  Yugoslavia want to live in concord with all, in 
brotherhood, in love, in community. We have in our present homeland 
many different nationalities and religious communities… We want to 
live with all as with brothers and sisters in one single house.104
Church-organized celebrations continued throughout 1970 as the SOC 
commemorated the 50th anniversary of  the restoration of  the Serbian patriarchate 
(1920–1970) and in 1971 the 300th anniversary of  Saint Basil of  Ostrog.105
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This atmosphere empowered the SOC to articulate grievances vocally. 
It initiated criticism of  the regime’s inability to resolve brewing confl icts in 
regions considered important to the Church. Since Kosovo’s post-war inclusion 
in Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians had long been dissatisfi ed with its position as 
a non-Slavic minority without its own republic.106 To ease tensions in 1966, 
Tito greatly expanded Kosovar rights and obliged the wealthier Northern 
republics to assist in the economic development of  the territory. Nevertheless, 
Kosovo’s frustration gradually became violent. Orthodox churches, shrines and 
gravestones were increasingly desecrated and priests, nuns and monks harassed. 
Tensions exploded in November 1968, when large-scale demonstrations and 
violent riots broke out.107 Under media suppression, Tito deployed the JNA to 
quell the unrest. While quick to crackdown, Tito made no attempt to seek other 
forms of  resolution. Despite being one of  the targets of  the riots, neither the 
SOC nor Kosovar party representatives were asked to cooperate to reduce the 
tensions. Again, an opportunity for inclusive Church engagement was missed.
On May 4, 1980, Josip Broz Tito passed away. Millions of  shocked 
Yugoslavs gathered, tearfully laying fl owers, holding military memorials and 
paying their last respects. However, the country would again be rocked by violent 
demonstrations in Kosovo. The March 1981 riots were fuelled by demands for 
republic status, only this time, accompanied with violence against Serb symbols 
and the SOC and rioters demanding “Unifi cation with Albania.”108 Again, the 
regime answered with force, sending in militia and tank units and arresting 
hundreds of  protestors.109 
Less hindered by the 1966 accords, several SOC clerics penned an “Appeal 
for the Protection of  the Serbian Population and their Sacred Monuments in 
Kosovo” on Orthodox Good Friday 1982 to the Presidency of  the Yugoslavia, 
claiming that Albanian plans for “genocide” were being carried out.110 Using its 
publication outlets, it published the entire text in Pravoslavlje and other media, 
as Church spaces increasingly became the only venue where grievances could 
be expressed. Once again, aside from heavy-handed repression, no efforts were 
undertaken to bring the major stakeholders together to calm Kosovo.
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The fi nal years of  the Yugoslav project were characterized by greatly 
expanded activities of  protest. The federal SKVP and the republican KVPs were 
ineffectual in reeling in the Churches, which began to mobilize their spaces to 
fi ll the social vacuum. Tito’s passing and his apparent indifference to grooming a 
successor left many asking what might become of  Yugoslavia. The party’s fear of  
a situation in which religion would align itself  with anti-Yugoslav political forces 
would come true by the mid-1980s. The SOC Holy Bishop’s assembly began 
publicly to chronicle criminal acts perpetrated by Kosovar suspects against the 
Church. Pravoslavlje echoed the Church’s concern in regular columns and articles 
on the rise of  the “Albanian terror,” as well as in seminars and discussions 
on the topic held by the Church.111 The Church submitted formal complaints 
to provincial authorities in Kosovo, the Serbian KVP and the republican 
government, but they were never thoroughly investigated. The continued failure 
by Yugoslav governmental structures to have at least a cursory review of  the 
legitimacy of  such claims and take measures against perpetrators contributed 
to the SOC’s heightened sense of  being placed at an institutional disadvantage. 
With no credible guarantor, the SOC gradually began to instrumentalize its rich 
nationalist history of  suffering.112
By 1987, Slobodan Milošević had risen through the party ranks to become 
head of  the Serbian Communist Party. His springboard to political power took 
place at the 600th anniversary of  the Battle of  Kosovo. Flanked by ranking party 
members from the republics and SOC bishops, Milošević addressed a crowd 
of  nearly one million. Though sanctioned by the Yugoslav federal government 
and couched in socialist language, the event resembled a Church celebration. As 
one of  the fi rst high-ranking Serb offi cials to call for a comprehensive change 
in policy toward Serbia, Milošević found an ally in the SOC. Religion, religious 
symbolism and politics had now become inextricably intertwined in a self-
reinforcing dance.
The Catholic Church also strengthened its social profi le. By the mid-1980s, 
the large-scale Catholic celebrations began to take on more ethno-nationalist 
symbolism. While grand Church events continued to demonstrate the Church’s 
organizational ability, Glas Koncila had become the key voice in Church media. 
With little governmental censure, Glas signifi cantly contributed to creating a 
distinct Croatian identity. By 1989, the Catholic Church in Croatia had successfully 
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carved out its own space for re-assessing the foundation of  Croatian identity 
within a larger Yugoslavia. The rise of  Croat nationalist Franjo Tudjman in the 
late 1980s corresponded with that of  the Church. In 1987, Tudjman and his 
far-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned to ultranationalist diaspora 
Church centers in Western Europe, Australia and North America.113 By 1989, 
the HDZ’s platform was thoroughly laden with revisionist ideas of  historical 
injustices, Croat nationalism, conservative Catholic values and anti-Yugoslav, 
anti-Serb populism. Like Milošević, Tudjman received massive support from 
all elements of  the clergy. The marriage of  growing political nationalism and a 
potent religious element gave even more popular credibility to the HDZ.
As the fronts began to harden between Serbia, which was seeking to re-
centralize Yugoslavia, and an increasingly independence-minded Croatia, 
which sought to rid itself  of  the rest of  Yugoslavia, each camp gained political 
legitimacy from their respective Church. Set in motion by Tito’s liberalizations 
of  the Yugoslav system 1966, the departure from a repressive to a open religious 
policy channeled Serb and Croat frustrations with the direction of  Yugoslavia’s 
path into the hands of  national Churches.
Conclusions: Assessing Church–State Engagement and Free Spaces
Challenges to authoritarian rule can take on different forms, while factors 
that affect the complex institutional interaction between a regime and its 
stakeholders can be infi nite. Moreover, anti-authoritarian opposition is made 
increasingly complex by case-specifi c experiences. Attempts to explain changes 
in power structures through the scope of  elections, voter behavior, civil society, 
democratization, ethnicity and identity, revolution or violence have yielded 
endless lists of  works from across the landscape of  ancient and modern political 
science. It is a common trait of  human behavior and demonstrates one of  the 
most essential pillars of  political science: the struggle to attain, maintain and 
challenge power and accommodate competing ideas. 
To try to capture the vastness of  this central component is beyond the 
scope of  this article. However, I claim that the uniqueness of  this study lies not in 
explaining the end of  East German and Yugoslav communism, although it does 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of  this. I offer here an alternative 
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explanation to a different question: which set of  conditions and types of  
processes help us to temporally locate, theoretically identify and comparatively 
explain the variegated forms of  Church–state engagement which brought forth 
Church-based free spaces. The momentous year of  1989 in Eastern Europe is 
not the point of  departure here. Rather, it is the outcome of  a near 45-year-long 
history of  debate on religious policy. 
The empirical focus of  this study seeks to paint a picture in which free spaces 
are neither the natural outcome of  private meetings between small numbers 
of  individuals working in safe havens, nor do I claim that national Churches 
retained an innate oppositional quality. Contrary to the debate surrounding the 
development and role of  civil society, which tends to overlook the precise policy 
mechanisms and agent-to-agent interactions at the micro-level, this contribution 
demonstrates that Church-based free spaces are in fact a constructed social 
phenomenon, resulting from negotiated, institutional interactions by Church 
and state elites. To conclude, the complex interaction between Church and 
state in the execution of  religious policy across temporally organized periods 
offers us an additional tool in explaining the rise of  Church-based free spaces in 
authoritarian societies and the relationships between the rise of  these free spaces 
and end of  the European communist project.
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